























           
            
        
         










       





        
Disclaimer
The positions expressed in this paper are strictly those of the authors and represent
neither the opinion of the Wuppertal Institute nor of the German Federal Ministry
for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety.
The Wuppertal Institute is carrying out the “JIKO”-project on behalf of the German 







Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy
Döppersberg 19 • 42103 Wuppertal • Germany
www.wupperinst.org
December 2014











Options to Strategically Advance
National Climate Policies 











   
  









1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
 
2 The Role of Governments............................................................................................. 3
 
2.1 Proposing the Standardised Baseline ........................................................................................................... 3
 
2.2 Ensuring Data Quality ...................................................................................................................................... 4
 
3 Options for Strategic Intervention ............................................................................. 6
 
3.1 Choosing Sectors ................................................................................................................................................ 6
 
3.1.1 Considerations for Prioritizing Sectors ............................................................................................... 6
 
3.1.2 Overview of Proposed and Approved Standardised Baselines.................................................8
 
3.2 Choosing the Level of Aggregation ............................................................................................................... 9
 
3.2.1 Sector Disaggregation as a Necessity................................................................................................. 9
 
3.2.2 Sector Disaggregation to Strategically Advance the Climate Policy Agenda ................... 10
  
3.3 Mandatory or Voluntary Application of Standardised Baselines ........................................................ 13
 
3.4 Designing Quality Assessment and Quality Control Systems .............................................................. 14
 



















Standardised Baselines (SB) establish national
(or regional) greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
benchmarks which may e.g. serve as baseline 
emission factor for all CDM projects in one spe­
cific sector in a host country. In contrast to the 
standard CDM, host country governments pos­
sess a much more central role under the SB 
framework: Every SB has to be proposed 
through the host countries Designated National
Authority (DNA). This creates an opportunity for 
host countries to engage strategically in the 
development of SBs in order to advance their 
overall climate policy agenda. 
In this policy brief we discuss the opportunities 
and obligations of host country DNAs within
the SB framework and identify options for stra­
tegic intervention. Host countries can of course 
prioritize by selecting the right sectors for 
which they develop an SB in the first place.  
We demonstrate that by choosing the right lev­
el of aggregation of the sector to be covered,
DNAs can tailor their SBs to some extent to 
support certain technologies, fuels or feed­
stocks over others.
Furthermore, it is at the host countries’ discre­
tion to decide whether or not an SB should be 
mandatory or not, once it is approved. While we 
generally recommend that the application of an 
SB should be mandatory, there may be certain
configurations of the sector that give reason to 
deviate from that recommendation.
Last but not least, we discuss the DNAs’ role in 
managing the data for the development and 
maintenance of the SB. We recommend that 
host countries should take full advantage of po­
tential synergies between data collection for 
SBs and other data intensive processes such as 
national greenhouse gas inventories or national
statistics. SBs and the data gathered in the pro­
cess of developing them can also be a basis for 
the development of other mitigation instru­
ments such as Nationally Appropriate Mitiga­
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1 Introduction
 
Standardised Baselines (SB) establish national
(or regional) greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
benchmarks which may e.g. serve as baseline 
emission factor for all CDM projects in one spe­
cific sector in a host country. The concept was 
introduced as a tool to broaden the scope of 
the CDM beyond a purely project-based mech­
anism towards a more comprehensive sectoral 
one, to streamline the project cycle as well as to 
decrease transaction costs and thus to improve 
accessibility for smaller scale projects that 
would otherwise not be able to recoup the up­
front investment. Last but not least SBs can 
serve to improve environmental integrity by 
following a more standardised and thus more 
robust approach towards additionality demon­
stration. 
The decision to promote the standardization of 
baselines and monitoring methodologies under 
the CDM was made by the Conference and 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in
Cancun 2010 (CMP6). Parties explicitly noted 
“that the use of standardized baselines could re­
duce transaction costs, enhance transparency, ob­
jectivity and predictability, facilitate access to the 
clean development mechanism, particularly with 
regard to underrepresented project types and re­
gions, and scale up the abatement of greenhouse 
gas emissions, while ensuring environmental in­
tegrity“ (UNFCCC 2011, p. 2). Hence, the tool of
SBs is still relatively new and the regulatory 
framework is still work in progress. In fact, the 
CDM project standard has only been update in
June 2014 to make provision on how CDM pro­
jects should apply approved SBs (CDM Execu­
tive Board 2014a). The relevant documents 
have all received updates fairly recently or are 
about to be updated soon. See Box 1 for an 
overview of the pertinent procedures and 
guidelines with respect to SBs. 
Box 1: Documentation of the SB Framework
•	 Procedure for the development, revision, clarification 
and update of standardized baselines, Version 3.01: 
CDM EB75, Annex 33; 
•	 Guidelines for the Establishment of Sector-Specific 

Standardized Baselines, Version 2.0: CDM EB65, An­
nex 23;
 
•	 Guidelines for Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
of Data used in the Establishment of Standardised
Baselines, Version 2.0: CDM EB79, Annex 7;
•	 Standard: Determining Coverage of Data and Validity
of Standardized Baselines, Version 1.0: CDM EB77,
Annex 5;
•	 Guidelines for the Consideration of Suppressed De­
mand in CDM Methodologies, Version 2.0: CDM EB68,
Annex 2;
•	 Establishment of standardised baselines for afforesta­
tion and reforestation project activities under the 
CDM, Version 1.0: CDM EB70, Annex 10; 
Despite the recent crisis of international carbon 
markets (Michaelowa 2013; Hermwille 2013) the 
development of SBs and the SB framework is 
one of the few remaining frontiers at which the 
CDM is being actively advanced, not only by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat, but also by international
development agencies and national DNAs. A 
total of 23 SBs have been proposed to date 
(November 2014) six of which have been ap­
proved by the CDM Executive Board. Given the 
extremely low price levels of the recent time,
the prospects of revenues from CDM projects 
built on these SBs can hardly explain this inter­
est in the development of SBs.
The UNFCCC diplomacy is moving forward and 
as it is moving forward new instruments have 
become available, instruments that supposedly
play a significant in the future climate treaty to 
be adopted in Paris in 2015. These instruments 
include Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Ac­
tions (NAMAs) and New Market Mechanisms 
(NMM). Both NMM and NAMAs may require the 







nario and a project/programme scenario in
terms of GHG emissions. This is where the expe­
rience gained by the CDM can be a valuable re­
sources. However, the 244 approved method­
ologies of the standard CDM (as of November 
2014) are often very case-specific, supposedly
too specific to allow for the development of 
emission benchmarks for a whole sector at na­
tional scale. SBs are considered as an instru­
ment that may allow for transferring the 
knowledge and the wealth of methodological 
approaches to such new climate financing 
mechanisms (e.g. Burian et al. 2013; Arnaoudov 
2014). As the SB rules and procedures are de­
veloped under the UNFCCC framework, SBs are 
internationally recognized boosting the credi­
bility of any national mitigation efforts. 
In this policy brief we will investigate if and how
SBs can be used by host countries to strategi­
cally advance their climate policy agenda and at 
which stages of the SB design process there is 
room for strategic intervention. We will do so
by firstly discussing the role of host country 
governments in the development of SBs (chap­
ter 2). Consequently (chapter 3), we will discuss 
the various stages of the SB development pro­
cess in more detail highlighting possible lever­
age points for strategic policy making and the 
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2 The Role of Governments
 
The role of host country governments is much 
stronger in the proposition and administration 
of SBs than with the standard CDM and even 
Programmes of Activities (PoAs) under the 
CDM. Under the standard CDM and PoAs na­
tional governments have to establish Designat­
ed National Authorities (DNAs) that are in 
charge of processing proposed CDM projects.
Within the project cycle, DNAs are responsible 
to provide Letters of Approval to the project 
proponents that affirm that a proposed CDM 
activity is in line with national legislation. DNAs 
are also tasked with assessing whether or not a 
project contributes to the sustainable devel­
opment of the host country, and, eventually,
decide upon the approval of a project.
Since the development of projects was to be 
initiated by the private sector – by the compa­
nies hosting the projects, by specialised project 
developers or by foreign investors looking for 
opportunities to comply with their obligations 
under the EU ETS – setting sustainable devel­
opment criteria was the only means of steering 
the development of CDM projects in the de­
sired direction. The issue of who and how “sus­
tainable development” should be defined in the 
context of the CDM was subject to a lengthy 
and heated debate (Holm Olsen 2007), but fi­
nally it was affirmed in the CDM Modalities and
Procedures at COP 7 in Marrakech “that it is the 
host Party’s prerogative to confirm whether a 
clean development mechanism project activity 
assists it in achieving sustainable development“
(UNFCCC 2002, p 20). In fact, DNAs have inter­
preted this prerogative quite differently and 
developed a wide range of criteria to assess the 
sustainable development contributions of a 
proposed CDM project. They include economic
factors such as increased (foreign) investments,
employment generation, income generation,
the development of clean energy sources, and 
encouragement of touristic activity. Further­
more, many countries apply technological crite­
ria such as development of technical skills and 
capabilities, contribution to technological inno­
vation or transfer of technologies. While some
countries have focused very narrowly on one or 
two aspects, others apply a wide range of indi­
cators in their sustainability assessments 
(Tewari 2012). 
All in all, host country governments possess on­
ly limited means of spurring and steering sus­
tainable development – including energy and 
climate policy – with the standard CDM and 
even the modality of PoAs. However, with the 
move to more sectoral approaches under the 
CDM, namely with the advent of sector-specific 
standardised baselines for the determination of 
baseline emission factors and the possibility of
establishing positive lists of technologies, fuels 
or feedstocks that are deemed automatically 
additional, there is considerably more room for 
a proactive role of DNAs in promoting the CDM 
in their respective countries. 
2.1 Proposing the Standardised 
Baseline 
While under the standard CDM, the DNA’s role
is limited to assessing proposed projects and 
approving them, DNAs have a more central role 
for standardised baselines. Project participants,
industry organizations or other admitted ob­
server organisations, i.e. any organisation that is
registered for participation at UNFCCC meet­
ings, can propose a standardised baseline only 
through the DNA of the host country (CDM Ex­
ecutive Board 2012, §6). That leaves the DNAs 
















gaging at an early stage in the process of de­
veloping an SB.
In fact, many DNAs have been engaged quite 
substantially in the development of standard­
ised baseline. One example is the standardised 
baseline developed for the rice mill sector in
Cambodia (Kingdom of Cambodia 2013). The 
concept of the SB and the technical documen­
tation was developed in close cooperation be­
tween the Climate Change Department of the 
Ministry of Environment serving as the Cambo­
dian DNA and the Japanese Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies (IGES).1  
By playing such a central role in the procedure 
for the submission of a SB, DNAs can engage 
proactively in the development of SBs and pri­
oritize sectors where SBs can be particularly
beneficial.
2.2 Ensuring Data Quality 
DNAs are not only in charge of submitting pro­
posed SBs to the UNFCCC Secretariat, they are 
also responsible for the quality and validity of 
the data used to develop that SB as well as 
keeping track of the data for future revisions 
and updates of the proposed SB. 
The development of an SB is a highly data in­
tensive process and high quality of data is cru­
cial for the reliability and environmental integri­
ty of the SB. In some cases data may be 
available through secondary sources, but in
many other cases this may not be the case.
DNAs are therefore required to establish quality 
control procedures in order to ensure that the 
data are relevant, complete, consistent, credi­
ble, current, accurate and objective. In addition, 
1 Personal interviews with Mr Kamal Uy, Deputy Director of 
the Climate Change Unit of the Cambodian Minsitry of En­
vironment serving as the Cambodian DNA (3 July 2013) 
and Ms Akiko Fukui, Policy Researcher Climate and Energy 
at IGES (8 July 2014). 
processing data to derive standardized base­
lines should be conservative, secure, transpar­
ent and traceable. According to the definition 
of the CDM Executive Board, “Quality control 
(QC) [...] is a system of routine technical activities 
to be conducted by a DNA to assess and maintain
the quality of the datasets. It begins with pre­
submission QC activities, followed by post­
submission QC activities, internal review and a 
summary of the QC implementation (QC report)” 
(CDM Executive Board 2014b, §14b).
On a second level, DNAs are required to ensure 
that the QC system is working adequately, the 
routines are followed meticulously. They need 
to develop and establish a system of quality as­
surance (QA). “QA is a system developed by a 
DNA to ensure that the QC system is designed to 
meet the data quality objectives [...] and that it is 
implemented effectively. The conformity and the 
effectiveness of the QC system are reviewed and 
the review activities/results are reported (assess­
ment report) by DOEs.” (CDM Executive Board 
2014b, §14c).
In other words, DNAs have full responsibility 
over the data that is gathered and used in SBs. 
Meeting highest data management standards 
as outlined in the QA/QC guidelines is a daunt­
ing task for many DNAs, especially those with 
limited capabilities, but even for more devel­
oped countries. However, it is also an oppor­
tunity. In a series of interviews conducted by 
Hermwille et al. (2013) respondents agreed that 
the QA/QC Guidelines are an essential element 
of the SB framework to ensure environmental 
integrity and hence the credibility of the ap­
proach. Furthermore, data management is seen 
as a key component that can add to the devel­
opment of other mitigation instruments such as 
New Market Mechanisms (NMM), instruments
under the NAMA framework or within the oper­
ations of the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Basical­
ly, any mitigation activity that entails a form of 
measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) 
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system. Investment in the robust QA and QC 
systems is thus seen as paying a multiple divi­
dend, especially when data management under 
the proposed SB is integrated with other data 




























In this section we will discuss the various op­
portunities for DNAs to prioritize and direct the 
development of SBs in order to incentivise pro­
ject activities in a desired area. We will do so by
following the structure of the SB guidelines and 
highlighting options for strategic intervention 
at all relevant steps. 
3.1 Choosing Sectors 
3.1.1	 Considerations for Prioritizing 
Sectors 
The first and most straight forward question is
what sector to choose for the development of a 
SB in the first place. UNDP (2013) have pro­
posed a decision making process to aid DNAs in
prioritizing and selecting the right sector(s) to 
develop a SB (see Figure 1 below). Additionally,
we have identified a number of considerations 
to be made in the decision making process.
•	 What are national priorities? 
Countries may have priorities for promoting 
development in certain sectors. For example, 
they might be interested in developing indus­
trial production in a certain field or target 
households in order to reduce poverty through 
e.g. rural electrification or the distribution of 
improved energy efficient and clean cook 
stoves.
•	 Where is the highest mitigation poten­
tial? 
The development of an SB requires a significant 
investment. The returns to this investment are 
likely to be highest where there is a high miti­
gation potential.
•	 Where is the highest potential for CDM 
projects? 
The sector with the highest mitigation potential
is not necessary the sector with the highest po­
tential for CDM projects. It may be the case that 
mitigation potentials are difficult to leverage 
due to barriers such as unclear ownership or re­
sponsibility for carbon emissions. Other cases 
may be that it is hard to monitor and/or verify 
the emissions and/or emission reductions. This
is true for example for the land-use sector.
•	 Where can a SB have the highest impact 
on reducing transaction cost?
The concept of standardised baselines was in­
troduced explicitly with the hope that they 
could reduce transaction cost and facilitate ac­
cess to the CDM, particularly with regard to un­
derrepresented project types and regions (UN­
FCCC 2011). The development of SBs should 
therefore be prioritized for sectors where 
standard CDM methodologies have hitherto 
underperformed. SBs could have a large impact 
particularly in sectors where there is a large po­
tential of rather small scale CDM projects for 
which a determination of baseline emissions 
and demonstration of additionality would incur 
transaction cost that exceed the potential earn­
ings through the CDM.
Another option is to use the SB framework to 
develop a standardised grid emission factor for 
the country (or a region of countries) that can 
then be used in a wide range of project types 
from renewable energy projects to various 
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Figure 1: Schematic decision making process for standardised baseline sector identification. Source: UNDP 2013.
cuss that latter option more extensively in sec­
tion 3.1.2 below.
For more advanced large-scale activities, de­
spite being of national interest, it could be 
more appropriate to provide support to foster 
conventional CDM projects. SBs, in turn, are 
particularly valuable for small-scale activities,
for example economic efficiency on the level of 
households and small and medium enterprises.
•	 Which types of projects are likely to re­
ceive strongest demand?
In times of plummeting prices on international
carbon markets and not much for hope for early
recovery of the market, it is unclear whether or 
not CDM projects can find a source of demand 
for the generated CERs. Currently, the only re­
maining buyers in the market are either institu­
tional buyers from developed countries or buy­
ers from the voluntary carbon market
(Hermwille 2013). Institutional buyers include, 
inter alia, the World Bank’s Pilot Auctioning Fa­



















































for Development (Ci-Dev) (World Bank 2013), 
the Norwegian Carbon Procurement Facility 
(NorCaP) and the NEFCO Carbon Fund (NEFCO 
2014), the latter two procuring CERs for the na­
tional accounts for Nordic countries. What both 
institutional buyers and buyers at the voluntary 
market have in common, is that they typically 
apply selection criteria beyond the price of the 
CERs. For voluntary carbon markets it is highly 
appreciated if projects feature strong sustaina­
ble development co-benefits and can thus be 
used for promotion of the buyer’s corporate so­
cial responsibility. Not all sectors and project 
types are equally apt for this type of marketing,
though (Kreibich et al. 2013).
3.1.2	 Overview of Proposed and Ap­
proved Standardised Baselines 
The first SB submitted to the CDM EB was an SB 
for charcoal production for consumption in
households and small and medium enterprises.
It was submitted in May 2012 and was ap­
proved by the CDM Executive Board at its 73rd 
session end of May 2013. Since then, the num­
ber of proposed SBs has increased significantly.
As of October 2014 a total of 23 SBs have been 
officially proposed and submitted to the UN­
FCCC Secretariat (UNFCCC 2014).
Thus far six different types of SBs have been 
proposed. By far the most common type are na­
tional (or regional) grid emission factors (11 na­
tional + 1 regional grid emission factor). The se­
cond most prolific type of SB is waste 
treatment, i.e. methane collection and/or de­
struction at landfill sites (6 proposed SBs). For 
all other types only one SB has been proposed 
each: charcoal production, clinker production,
rural electrification, rice milling and rice cultiva­
tion. However, only six of the proposed SBs 
have been approved so far. Figure 2 and Fig­
ure 3 give an overview of the types of proposed 
and approved SBs respectively and their corre­
sponding shares of the total of all SBs.
Figure 2: Overview of proposed standardised baselines as 
of October 2014. Source: UNFCCC (2014). 
charcoal 
17% 
Figure 3: Overview of approved standardised baselines as 
of October 2014. Source: UNFCCC (2014). 
The strong share of grid emission factors is no 
surprise. In fact, investment in a standardized 
grid emission factor can serve a long list of CDM 
projects. For example, nearly all renewable en­
ergy projects use a grid emission factor to cal­
culate the CO2 emissions abated. The electricity 
produced by the project facility (in kWh) is 
simply multiplied with the local grid emission
factor to calculate the amount of more carbon 
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jects that target electrical efficiency calculate 
their emission reductions similarly. A national
(or regional) grid emission factor has thus a very 
large ‘customer basis’ in terms of projects that 
could benefit from it.
Other SBs focus more on co-benefits of the pro­
jects that would use the SB. Examples are the 
charcoal SB in Uganda and the Ethiopian SB for 
rural electrification. 
3.2 Choosing the Level of Ag­
gregation 
A second and maybe less obvious opportunity 
for strategic intervention is the question of how 
to define the sector that is subject to the SB. 
The CDM Executive Board has defined the level 
of aggregation in the context of the SB frame­
work as follows: “The level of aggregation 
measures the extent to which consolidation of in­
formation from any parts or units to form a collec­
tive whole is undertaken. This consolidation is
usually done within a common sector, to provide 
information at a broader level to that at which de­
tailed observations are taken. Information on cat­
egories can be grouped or aggregated to provide 
a broader picture when this does not lead to mis­
representation. It can also be split or disaggregat­
ed when finer details are required by too much 
non-homogeneity” (CDM Executive Board 2011, 
§8a).
3.2.1	 Sector Disaggregation as a Neces­
sity 
Sometimes it may be necessary to disaggregate 
the sector into smaller sub-sectors to be able to 
derive a meaningful SB. As the definition quot­
ed above indicates, this may be the case if sec­
tors do not produce one homogeneous output.
An example would be the chemical industry 
that produces a large variety of different sub­
stances that are not comparable in terms of the 
inputs required nor the purposes they can be 
used for. A similar industry would be consumer 
electronics.
Equally difficult to provide a meaningful sector­
specific SB for are cross-cutting technologies 
such as pressurized air that can be used in a 
host of different applications in all types of (in­
dustrial) sectors. While there might be large ef­
ficiency potentials, it is hardly possible to ag­
gregate the very different applications in order 
to generate a meaningful benchmark.
Another problem for the development of a co­
herent benchmark appears when emerging in­
dustrial productions compete with manufactur­
ing in traditional small-scale enterprises in one 
and the same sector. This is the case in many 
developing countries. Usually, modern large­
scale industries dramatically outperform tradi­
tional labour-intensive small-scale manufactur­
ing in terms of efficiency. Still, these manufac­
turing processes might provide income to 
thousands of people and therefore are ex­
tremely important to the host country’s econ­
omy. Comparing the two parts in one SB would 
most likely result in an emission benchmark 
that is impossible to achieve for small-scale ac­
tivities and would thus rule out any CDM activi­
ty for that part of the sector. 
An example for this problem is the case of the 
Cambodian SB for the rice mill sector. In the 
country, a small number of large-scale rice mills 
(>3000 tonnes of annual rice production) con­
tribute more than 60 per cent of the sectors to­
tal output. However, these large-scale rice mills 
are technically very different from the vast 
amount of small-scale rice mills (averaging 800 
tonnes of annual rice production) that are be­
ing operated in the country. Consequently, the 
SB was proposed only for the part of the sector 
consisting of small-scale rice mills with an an­
nual production below 3000 tonnes of rice 
(Kingdom of Cambodia 2013). 
Generally, DNAs face a dilemma when deciding 
the appropriate level of aggregation: More ag­














increases thus the basis of potential projects in
which it can be applied; less aggregation may 
lead to SBs that more closely mirror the tech­
nical configuration of the sector under consid­
eration and thus may improve environmental
integrity. This is particularly the case when sec­
tors are very heterogeneous in terms of output 
produced or production processes applied. The 
more one disaggregates, the closer one gets to 
traditional project-by-project CDM.
3.2.2	 Sector Disaggregation to Strate­
gically Advance the Climate Poli­
cy Agenda 
Choosing the level of aggregation can also be 
used to pre-determine the type of mitigation 
options that are favoured by the proposed SB.
The SB framework allows for a dual approach 
for developing a SB. It can either be developed 
on the basis of approved tools and methodolo­
gies – the various grid emission factors dis­
cussed above were all developed using the
‘Tool to calculate the emission factor for an elec­
tricity system’ (CDM Executive Board 2013b).  
The other route to develop a SB is to follow the 
approach specified in the SB guidelines. This so­
called performance penetration approach (PP) 
stipulates a way to derive a positive list of tech­
nologies, fuels or feedstock in a sector. In this
approach, technologies/ fuels/ feedstock are 
ranked in descending order of their emissions 
intensity. The least emission intensive technol­
ogy/ fuel/ feedstock needed to produce a cer­
tain percentage of the sector’s output is select­
ed as baseline technology/ fuel/ feedstock. All
technologies/ fuels/ feedstock that feature low­
er emission intensities than the baseline tech­
nology are candidates for the inclusion in a pos­
itive list of technologies/ fuels/ feedstock that 
are automatically deemed additional. However, 
the SB Guidelines require to demonstrate addi­
tionality in a two-step approach. Candidates for 
the positive list that have been identified using 
the performance-penetration approach need to 
10 
 
undergo further scrutiny in a second step. For 
each of the candidate technologies, fuels or 
feedstock it has to be established on a sectoral
level that these are either not financially viable 
(i.e. through investment analysis) or are facing 
barriers. 
Moreover, the baseline technology is not only 
used to condition the additionality of projects,
it is also used to determine the crediting base­




   
Figure 4: Illustration of the performance-penetration approach – full integration of the power sector. 
Source: Wuppertal Institute. 
 
Figure 5: Illustration of the performance-penetration approach – fossil fuel generation capacity.  
Source: Wuppertal Institute. 
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 
Figure 6: Illustration of the performance-penetration approach – hard coal generation capacity.  





















Figure 4 depicts an example of the power sec­
tor of a hypothetical country: All technologies 
that contribute to the sector’s output are 
ranked as described above. The most polluting 
technology available is lignite, followed by con­
ventional hard coal, more efficient hypercritical 
coal, oil-fired power plants, open cycle gas tur­
bines (OCGT), combined cycle gas turbines 
(CCGT) and as the best performer renewable 
energies. The result is a step function as illus­
trated in the figure. 
The CDM Executive Board has defined a prelim­
inary additionality and crediting threshold, i.e.
the percentage value that determines the base­
line technology. The EB chose a value of 80 per 
cent for priority sectors – energy in households,
electricity generation in isolated systems and 
agriculture – and 90 per cent in other sectors.
Correspondingly, we chose 90 per cent as the 
value that determines the baseline technology 
in our example. The last, i.e. most efficient,
technology that is needed to generate 90 per 
cent of the sectors output is the baseline tech­
nology – CCGT. The baseline technology also 
determines the baseline emission factor to cal­
culate emission reductions which simply equals
the emission factor of the baseline technology.
All technologies that are more efficient than the 
baseline technology – in this case only renewa­
ble energy technologies – are candidates for a 
positive list of the SB. In other words, defining 
the level of aggregation over the entire 
power sector leads to a SB that supports the 
deployment of renewable energy.
However, if the level of aggregation is altered in 
a way that only fossil fuel power plants are in­
cluded in the SB (see Figure 5), the result of the 
performance-penetration approach shifts con­
siderably. Again, all technologies that contrib­
ute to the output of the defined sector are 
ranked according to their performance. As re­
newable energy options are not included, the 
most efficient technology necessary to produce 
a cumulative  90 per cent threshold will change
as the total output of the defined sector (fossil 
power generation) is different from the total
power generation.
In our example, the 90 per cent threshold is ex­
ceeded by oil-fired power plants which is con­
sequently identified as the new baseline tech­
nology. The baseline emission factor of the SB,
now equalling the emission factor of oil-fired 
power plants, is significantly higher than in the 
first example. Also, both types of gas-fired 
power plants (OCGT and CCGT) perform better 
than the baseline technology and are thus can­
didates for the positive list of technologies that 
are deemed automatically additional. Exclud­
ing renewable energies and reducing the 
level of aggregation to fossil fuel generation 
capacities only, results in a SB that incentiv­
ises fuel switch from coal and oil towards 
natural gas.
To take this approach even further, one could 
imagine a SB specifically developed for (hard) 
coal fired power plants. The level of aggrega­
tion would be defined accordingly. As Figure 6 
illustrates, in our example this would lead to a 
situation where conventional coal fired power 
plants are identified as the baseline technology 
and a corresponding relatively high baseline 
emission factor for the sector. In this scenario,
hypercritical coal power plants would qualify as 
candidates for the positive list of additional
technologies. Limiting the level of aggrega­
tion to just coal fired power plants could 
lead to a SB that promotes the deployment 
of energy efficient technologies on the sup­
ply side.
Obviously the different approaches are incom­
patible. It is hard to imagine that a measure is 
excluded in one positive list, but included in
another positive list. Hence, when defining the 
level of disaggregation, DNAs need to take a 
conscious decision: they can use this option for 
strategic intervention to proactively shape their
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newables over fuel switch or fuel switch over 
supply side energy efficiency measures.
Theoretically, though, this opportunity could 
also be used by private sector actors. If for ex­
ample actors from the field of renewable ener­
gy develop a SB on their own and approach 
their national DNA, they could set facts over the 
mitigation priorities to some extent and thus 
gain a comparative advantage over their com­
petitors. DNAs should therefore be aware and 
pay due consideration to SBs that are promoted 
by private sector organisations.
3.3 Mandatory or Voluntary Ap­
plication of Standardised 
Baselines 
Another crucial question in the process of de­
veloping a SB is the question whether or not a 
SB, once it is approved, should be mandatory 
for all newly proposed CDM activities or wheth­
er the use of the SB should be voluntary. Ex­
perts have repeatedly expressed their concerns 
that SBs, if not mandatory, could lead to a situa­
tion where project developers could cherry pick 
whatever option (SB or standard CDM) gener­
ates more CERs and is thus preferable for them. 
This could lead to a deterioration of the overall
environmental integrity of the CDM (Spalding-
Fecher and Michaelowa 2013; Schneider et al.
2012).
The CDM Executive Board has taken up the dis­
cussion at various occasions. Most lately, the is­
sue was discussed at the 78th meeting of the 
CDM Executive Board in early April 2014. After a 
heated discussion, the Board decided to follow 
the interpretation of a legal analysis prepared 
by the UNFCCC Secretariat. The board conclud­
ed that following from the mandate provided in
Decision 3/CMP.6 §47 it is at the discretion of 
the host countries’ DNA to decide whether or 
not it wants to introduce a SB in the first play 
and whether or not it should be mandatory 
once it is approved (CDM Executive Board 
2014c). However, the CDM Executive Board re­
served its right to reject a proposed SB if it sees 
the environmental integrity of the SB endan­
gered due to voluntary applicability of the SB
(Arens 2014). 















historic BAU with CDM project 
SB 
Figure 7: Mandatory or voluntary application of standard­
ised baseline and its effects on different types of projects. 
Source: Wuppertal Institute in the style of Spalding-Fecher 
and Michaelowa (2013). 
In the following paragraphs we will discuss if 
and under what conditions it may be reasona­
ble to deviate from the recommended practice 
of mandatory application of SBs. We will 
demonstrate that the structure of the sector my
be configured in a way that a mandatory SB can 
effectively exclude a certain type of projects,
which could be a reason to allow for voluntary 
application of SBs.
In theory there are five different types of pro­
jects (illustrated in Figure 7). In this example we
assume that the standardised benchmark emis­
sion factor is equal to a “standardised addition­
ality baseline” (illustrated by the dashed line). 
Every technology that features specific emis­
sions below this benchmark emission factor is
automatically deemed additional. 
Type A exemplifies a project that has no cred­
itable mitigation potential, because the mitiga­
tion potential is already realized through busi­
ness-as-usual (BAU) developments and even 



















not reduce its relative emissions below the 
benchmark emission factor established by the 
SB. Type A projects are not eligible for the CDM
under a SB nor standard CDM.
Type B, instead, would be eligible under stand­
ard CDM methodologies as the project emis­
sions are significantly below BAU emissions.
However, as project emissions are still above 
the benchmark emission factor, this project 
would not qualify under a mandatory SB.
Type C represents a project that would be eligi­
ble both under SB and standard CDM method­
ologies. However, if the SB is used, the CERs is­
sued to this project were significantly reduced.
Under standard CDM methodologies the pro­
ject would receive credits equalling the differ­
ence between BAU and the project emissions 
(difference between light grey column and blue 
column). Under the SB, however, it would only 
receive the difference between the crediting 
baseline (dashed line) and the project emissions 
(blue column). Hence, the project would chose 
to use the standard CDM methodology, if the 
applicability of the SB were voluntary. If manda­
tory, the project would be “under-credited” and 
generate net mitigation.
Type D represents a project that would not be 
eligible under standard CDM methodologies,
because the project emissions equal the BAU 
emissions. However, under a SB it would be eli­
gible, because project emissions are below the 
benchmark emission factor. The introduction of 
a SB will therefore inevitably lead to the genera­
tion of non-additional credits, if these kind of 
projects exist.
Type E is a project that, again would be eligible
under both approaches. However, with the SB 
benchmark emission factor by far exceeding 
BAU emissions for this type of projects; with the 
application of the SB the project will be ‘over­
credited’.
So how should a DNA decide? Should it require 
new projects to apply an approved SB, or not? 
Principally, the literature seems to suggest a 
preference for the mandatory application of 
SBs, mainly because a more standardised ap­
proach to additionality demonstration is hoped 
to rule out fraudulent or at least highly uncer­
tain additionality demonstration at the individ­
ual project level and will thus result in more ob­
jective criteria (Hayashi and Michaelowa 2012; 
Hayashi et al. 2010).
However, there may be cases where a manda­
tory application of the approved SB would lead 
to the exclusion of otherwise additional pro­
jects (represented by type B in our example 
above). If the sector comprises a large number 
of projects similar to this type, a mandatory ap­
plicability would significantly reduce the overall 
CDM potential of the sector. Such a scenario is 
not unlikely if both retrofit of existing facilities 
(brownfield projects) as well as newly con­
structed facilities (greenfield projects) are in­
cluded under one and the same SB. For existing 
facilities it may well be impossible to achieve 
the same levels of efficiency as a newly con­
structed facility. If benchmark emission factors 
and additionality threshold are determined by a 
greenfield project, a mandatory SB would effec­
tively eliminate any CDM projects in the sub­
sector of brownfield projects.
3.4 Designing Quality Assess­
ment and Quality Control 
Systems
As laid out in section 2.2 above, DNAs are in 
charge of establishing a QA/QC system. The first 
version of the corresponding guidelines re­
ceived strong criticism for being too demand­
ing especially for DNAs with limited capacities 
and at the same time providing little guidance 
on how to deal with imperfect data (e.g.
Hermwille et al. 2013). The recent update of the 
QA/QC Guidelines, however, provides much
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their obligation. The new version now can be 
understood as a best practice manual instead of 
detailed prescriptions.
This gives DNAs some freedom in tailoring their 
QA/QC systems to their specific needs. It does 
allow to establish relatively straight forward 
QA/QC procedures that are very specific for the 
SB and have very little impact beyond. Still, this 
approach may not be recommended in all cas­
es. Instead, a couple of initiatives demonstrate 
how data gathered in the process of SB devel­
opment as well as institutional capacities de­
veloped can create synergies between the CDM
and other fields of climate policy.  
For example, the Cambodian DNA has integrat­
ed the data management for its rice mill SB with
the data management for the development of 
national greenhouse gas inventories. 2  Other
examples of synergies between data manage­
ment for SBs under the CDM and other climate 
policy instruments include the use of SBs for 
the development of Nationally Appropriate Mit­
igation Actions (NAMAs). If a country considers 
to increase its ambition on mitigating climate 
change in a sector and to develop a NAMA, SBs 
and data collected to develop it can be invalu­
able. Burian et al. (2013) have demonstrated 
how a SB could serve as the basis for a NAMA
for the Indonesian cement sector.
The Philippines have even gone further and de­
veloped a SB specifically for the purpose of 
building a holistic measurement, reporting, and 
verification (MRV) system for a NAMA in the rice 
cultivation sector. The SB that has bee submit­
ted the UNFCCC Secretariat in May 2014 is to 
form a sound basis for the proposed NAMA 
(Republic of the Philippines 2014; Arnaoudov 
2014). This example illustrates well how SBs in 
general and a robust QA/QC in particular can 
help to develop climate change mitigation in­ 
2 Personal interview with Kamal Uy, Deputy Director of the 
Climate Change Unit of the Ministry of Environment of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia, 3 July 2013.
struments beyond the market based mecha­
nisms. DNAs should therefore see the devel­
opment of a sound QA/QC system as an in­




































As opposed to the standard CDM, the role of 
host country governments is much more pro­
nounced under SBs as the onus for submitting 
(and promoting) SBs lies with the host coun­
tries’ DNAs. With this strategic opportunity 
comes also the responsibility of handling the 
data necessary for establishing and maintaining 
a SB. 
We have identified a number of key stages at 
which DNAs may strategically intervene to de­
sign SBs in a way that complements well their 
respective national climate policy agendas.
Of course, DNAs can and should prioritize sec­
tors for the development of SBs in the first 
place. DNAs should not only consider where 
there national priorities lie, but also for which 
sectors automatic additionality and/or sectoral
benchmark emission factors can be most bene­
ficial to spur the development of mitigation 
projects.
A second vantage point may be the definition 
of the right level of aggregation. We have 
shown that some times it is necessary to dis­
aggregate the sector into smaller sub-sectors in 
order to be able to construct a meaningful SB. If
the sectors are highly heterogeneous in either 
output or inputs, it may not be feasible to es­
tablish one SB to cover the entire sector.  
We have also shown that deliberately choosing 
the level of aggregation may result in SBs that 
favour certain technologies, fuels or feedstocks 
and eliminate others from being eligible. We
have exemplified this effect on a hypothetical 
power sector. By tweaking the level of aggrega­
tion it was possible to construct mutually exclu­
sive SBs to promote renewable energy, to in­
centivise fuel shift or to promote supply-side 
energy efficiency measures.
Box 2: Key Questions for DNAs
DNAs play a central role in the development process of
 
Standardised Baselines. This paper has laid out some of
 
their key responsibilities. The following questions can 

guide DNAs in the development phase of a SB.
 
Prioritizing sectors 
•	 What are national priority sectors?
•	 Where is the highest mitigation potential?
•	 Where is the highest potential for CDM projects?
•	 Where can a SB have the biggest impact on trans­
action costs?
•	 Which type of projects receive strongest demand?
Defining sector boundaries
•	 Is it necessary to divide the sector e.g. because of
inhomogeneity?
•	 Does a subdivision of the sector favour/disfavour
certain technologies or mitigation options?
•	 Should the application of the SB be mandatory for
CDM projects?
Data management 
•	 Where can synergies with other data management
activities be realized (e.g. with GHG inventories or
national statistics)?
•	 Can data gathered in the context of the SB be used
in other context (e.g. NAMAs, New Market Mecha­
nisms)? 
The example was admittedly chosen to illus­
trate the potential effect. Not every power sec­
tor will be configured in a way to repeat this ex­
ercise. It depends on the combination of 
technologies available and their respective 
production shares whether or not it is possible 
to tailor a SB to specifically favour certain tech­
nologies. We still believe that in any case there 
is room for strategic decision making. DNAs 
should be aware of this room and make their 
decisions consciously and wary of their wider 
national climate policy agenda.
Furthermore, it is at the discretion of the host 
country to decide whether or not a SB, once 
approved, should be mandatory for the devel­
opment of new CDM project activities, or not.
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preferable because of the potentially detri­
mental effect of voluntary SBs. If voluntary, pro­
ject proponents could cherry pick whatever ap­
proach generates more credits for them, this
could effectively lead to over-crediting of CDM 
projects. Nevertheless, it may be advisable in
specific cases to allow for voluntary application
of SBs, for example the sector under considera­
tion is heterogeneous (e.g. because both green­
field and brownfield projects are covered under 
the same SB) and a mandatory SB would effec­
tively exclude CDM projects in some types of 
projects thus cutting the CDM project potential.
Last but not least, DNAs are in charge of estab­
lishing QA/QC systems. We recommend that 
data management for SBs should be integrated 
with other data handling practices such as de­
velopment of greenhouse gas inventories or 
national statistics. There is a large potential for 
synergies in complementing existing data sets 
and developing data management capacities 
for multiple purposes. Data collected in the 
context of SBs could also be used for the devel­
opment of other climate mitigation instruments 
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